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INTRODUCTION 
n his prologue to Peyote vs. the State: Religious Freedom on Trial, 
law professor Garrett Epps describes the legal, as well as human, 
impact of Employment Division v. Smith, the precedent-shattering 
religious freedom case argued by Oregon Attorney General Dave 
Frohnmayer in 1990.1 Professor Epps points out that the case was 
 
* Michael J. Clark is an Associate Professor of English at Portland State University and 
the Director of Portland State’s Center for Public Humanities. He holds a Ph.D. in 
Comparative Literature from Binghamton University (1989) and a J.D. from the University 
of Oregon School of Law (1995). His work focuses on literature and philosophy, literature 
and law, and film studies. He regularly teaches courses on copyright law, First Amendment 
law, and law in the digital world. 
1 GARRETT EPPS, PEYOTE VS. THE STATE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 1–6 (2009). 
I
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double-edged, and Dave knew it.2 As attorney general, he had 
attempted to repair the state’s relationship with the Native American 
tribes of the Northwest, and now he was arguing a case before the U.S. 
Supreme Court that would have the effect of restricting tribal religious 
practices.3 He knew, as well, that the “anger and dismay the decision 
would provoke[] would become in a way the meaning of [his] career.”4 
“Nothing he had done, nothing he would do,” Professor Epps adds, 
“would loom larger in the memory of history than this day’s work.”5 
The case illustrated the complexities of First Amendment 
jurisprudence, where freedom of expression, free exercise of religion, 
and Establishment Clause doctrine intertwine, resulting in seemingly 
unavoidable contradictions. It is certainly not a case addressing the role 
of the humanities in American culture. Or is it? In this Article, I will 
argue that a case like Smith, where spiritual beliefs are front and center, 
and where reflection on fundamental issues of human meaning are 
paramount, shows that the law is always a form of humanistic inquiry. 
In particular, I focus on Dave’s 2011 remarkable address at the annual 
banquet of the California Law Review to underscore his awareness of 
the humanistic core of legal study and practice. 
I 
THE FATE OF THE HUMANITIES 
For at least a decade, and with increasing frequency, we have been 
hearing that the humanities are “in crisis.” As higher education (along 
with all of human culture, it would seem) moves ever deeper into the 
digital age, traditional models of self-reflexive humanistic inquiry are 
giving way to algorithmic practices that show remarkable accuracy at 
predicting human behavior, environmental trends, economic outcomes, 
and even the nature of human desire itself. Cognitive neuroscience has 
staked significant claims in fields as diverse as consumer behavior and 
religion. It is hard to argue with many of the successes of algorithmic 
prediction—a fact that has rendered those interested in inquiries into 
human agency and freedom seem more and more wistful. According to 
a 2015 special issue of College Literature, the humanities are like an 
image retreating in the rear view mirror of a speeding car—”social, 
economic, and technological forces, whether exploited by unthinking 
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administrators and legislators or simply running to their own logical 
conclusion, seem to diminish or even to render superfluous humanistic 
modes of inquiry.”6 The most cursory scan of The Chronicle of Higher 
Education or The New York Times will find comments like the 
following, penned by a Ph.D. candidate in history at Vanderbilt 
University: “What if . . . humanities education . . . no longer has a 
significant role to play in American life?”7 
One of the recurrent problems in any discussion of the humanities is 
that few people can give a definition of the term—the field is too broad, 
too porous, and too amorphous to be pinned down in any coherent 
sense. In such cases, it is often best to start with a simple proffer: the 
humanities are any activity associated with the study of the human 
condition. Implicit in that project is an inquiry into the nature of “the 
human” itself: What does it mean to be human?8 This implies self-
reflection, a good dose of doubt, and perhaps even some skepticism. 
We can probably agree with Sitze, Sarat, and Wolfson in their essay, 
The Humanities in Question, that: 
Few self-identified humanists would disagree with the premise that 
“the humanities” serves as a name for a set of inquiries characterized 
by their commitment to self-questioning and self-critique. According 
to this understanding, which claims to find its roots in the Socratic 
maxim that “the unexamined life is not worth living for a human 
 
6 Adam Sitze et al., The Humanities in Question, 42 C. LITERATURE 191, 191 (2015). 
7 Alexander I. Jacobs, The Humanities at the End of the World, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Oct. 2, 2015, at B4. 
8 See, for instance, the statement by William Adams, Chair of the National Endowment 
for the Humanities: 
People who engage in a profound way with a broad range of disciplines—
including, and in some cases especially, with the humanities—are preparing to 
engage the challenges of life. They are creative and flexible thinkers; they acquire 
the habits of mind needed to find solutions to important problems; they can even 
appreciate the value of making mistakes and changing their minds. I am convinced 
that this kind of study is not merely defensible but critical to our national welfare. 
Office of the Chairman, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR HUMAN., http://www.neh.gov/about 
/chairman (last visited Apr. 18, 2016). 
Or, see the following from the Stanford Humanities Center: 
 The humanities can be described as the study of how people process and 
document the human experience. Since humans have been able, we have used 
philosophy, literature, religion, art, music, history and language to understand and 
record our world. These modes of expression have become some of the subjects 
that traditionally fall under the humanities umbrella. Knowledge of these records 
of human experience gives us the opportunity to feel a sense of connection to those 
who have come before us, as well as to our contemporaries. 
What Are the Humanities?, STAN. HUMAN. CTR., http://shc.stanford.edu/what-are-the             
-humanities (last visited Apr. 18, 2016). 
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being,” the humanities allow self-examination to give life lasting 
shape and structure, to give meaning and value to the life of the free 
citizen, and as such to humanize life itself.9 
The language of the last sentence above is telling: providing life with 
shape, structure, meaning, value, and freedom; the cultivation of 
citizenship; and the humanization of life itself. This sounds a lot like a 
solid program for legal study and, beyond that, a professional legal 
life—maybe even the good life. 
II 
HUMANITIES AND THE LAW 
The idea that law can not only benefit from regular interaction with 
the humanities, but that the law is also a distinct form of humanistic 
inquiry may seem a tad idealistic, and thus it is likely to evoke raised 
eyebrows, a fatigued sigh, or perhaps a shrug. Law and the humanities? 
Haven’t we been down this road before? One remembers such 
moments as the law and literature movement (the 1980s), critical legal 
studies (the 1980s and 1990s), and “deconstruction and the law” 
(somewhere in a universe long ago). The latter in particular seems more 
and more like a youthful phase that the legal community tarried with 
until it moved on to more serious business. Depending upon your 
interlocutor, law is a social science, a behavioral science, a hybrid of 
the human sciences, a partner with economics, or a project in political 
science or government. All of these make quick sense to those in the 
profession; law is not a branch of the humanities. Jack Balkin and 
Sanford Levinson, in Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy 
Relationship, use the friendship and correspondence between Oliver 
Wendell Holmes and Learned Hand to underscore this last point.10 
Hand endorsed study of the great books as the best preparation for legal 
study and practice; Holmes argued that law was a “business,” where 
“‘people . . . pay lawyers to argue for them’ and ‘predict . . . the 
incidence of public force through the instrumentality of the courts.’”11 
Balkin and Levinson explain further: 
 
9 Sitze et al., supra note 6, at 192 (citations omitted). 
10 See generally Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law & the Humanities: An Uneasy 
Relationship, DAEDALUS, Spring 2006, at 105. 
11 Id. at 106 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law After One Hundred 
Years, HARV. L. REV. 991, 991 (1997) (transcribing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Justice, 
Massachusetts Supreme Court, Address at the Dedication of a New Hall at Boston 
University School of Law (Jan. 8, 1897))). 
CLARK (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2016  9:24 AM 
2016] A Legacy of Expression: Dave Frohnmayer and the Humanities in Oregon 681 
 Holmes and Hand were friends—but they clearly disagreed over 
the substance of legal studies. While Hand in 1930 advocated the 
study of the humanities, Holmes advocated the study of the social 
sciences, particularly economics. Hand evoked Shakespeare and 
Milton; Holmes’s imagined alternative to black-letter law was 
statistics. Where Hand welcomed the edifying influence of moral 
philosophy, Holmes strove to make law more scientific and even 
industrial, discarding all forms of humanist sentimentality.12 
Balkin and Levinson conclude that the relationship of law to the 
humanities is tenuous, and that today’s law student is “more likely to 
be acquainted with Ronald Coase’s Theory of the Firm than with 
Plato’s Theory of Forms.”13 Interestingly, they also seem to assume 
that a definition of the humanities needs little elaboration; instead, they 
turn to a discussion of the nature of the study and practice of law.14 Is 
the canon of legal materials in use today sufficient to become a good 
lawyer?15 Is law a distinct discipline? Is it a science? Or is it a hybrid 
of many disciplines, more akin to a style, mood, or art?16 The 
professionalization of legal training is only a little over a century old,17 
and debates about the “essence” of the law—its inner nature, if you 
will—are akin to 1920’s debates about the essence and autonomy of 
the then-young cinema: Was cinema a form of theater? Dance? 
Photography? Music? Ultimately, the debate lost energy as the 
cinematic sphere matured, to the point that a “film” was clearly a 
distinct art form that did not need to genuflect before the world of the 
stage. 
Perhaps the best way to consider these questions—and the best way 
to get to the hidden premise of my claims here—is to turn to literature, 
the paradigmatic case of the humanities, as well one of law’s closest 
kin. To be more specific, we might say the field of literary narrative, 
since it is still rather rare to see judicial opinions in free verse. Both law 
and literature are, according to many commentators, “rhetorical 
through and through,”18 suggesting that the construction of an 
 
12 Id. 
13 Id. The footnote accompanying this excerpt is illuminating, too, pointing out that the 
most heavily cited article by legal academics up to 2006 was indeed Coase’s The Problem 
of Social Cost. Id. at 106 n.7 (discussing R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & 
ECON. 1 (1960)). 
14 See id. at 112–13. 
15 Id. at 107. 
16 Id. 
17 See id. 
18 Id. at 113. 
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impregnable palisade between the two fields may be neither necessary, 
nor wise, nor, as I will argue, possible. 
The rhetorical basis of law is so well established that it generates 
truisms. We have all heard the locution “any first-year law student 
knows (fill in the blank),” a phrase that indicates that some levels of 
disciplinary sophistication and insight are so basic as to be natural to 
the field. This suggests that there are core components of legal reason 
and legal practice; at the same time, this is a rhetorical device. Once 
again, I will cite Balkin and Levinson: 
The work that practicing lawyers do today has much in common with 
the lessons of classical rhetoric taught centuries ago in the great 
humanist academies of Ancient Greece and Rome. It is no accident 
that Chaim Perleman, the coauthor of The New Rhetoric, a classic in 
the field first published in 1969, was also a legal theorist, or that 
Stanley Fish, the well-known literary critic, has more recently taken 
delight in studying, and manipulating, the rhetorical tropes of 
contemporary American legal theory.19 
III 
AN EXAMPLE OF LAW AND LITERATURE 
Almost certainly, the progenitor of the field of law and literature is 
James Boyd White, a law professor at the University of Michigan, 
whose work since the 1973 publication of The Legal Imagination20 has 
explored the ethical, narrative, stylistic, and moral issues embedded in 
both disciplines. Other signature moments were the creation of the 
Cardozo Studies of Law and Literature in 1989;21 the Yale Journal of 
Law and the Humanities in 1989;22 Richard Weisberg’s Poethics in 
1992;23 the work of Robert Cover, particularly his 1986 essay, Violence 
and the Word;24 Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner’s Literature and 
the Law: A Misunderstood Relation;25 and the work of the seemingly 
 
19 Id. at 113. 
20 JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (abr. ed. 1985) (1973). 
21 The Cardozo Studies of Law and Literature was a periodical published by Cardozo 
School of Law from 1989 to 2001. Since 2002, Routledge has published the successor-
periodical, Law & Literature, in partnership with the Cardozo School of Law. For access to 
full volumes of the periodical, see Law & Literature, TAYLOR FRANCIS ONLINE, 
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rlal20#.VxalERIrKCQ (last visited Apr. 19, 2016). 
22 See About Us, YALE J.L. & HUMAN., https://www.law.yale.edu/student-life/student      
-journals-and-publications/yale-journal-law-humanities (last visited Apr. 19, 2016).  
23 RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 
(1992). 
24 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986). 
25 RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988). 
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indefatigable and always provocative professor of literature, 
humanities, and law, Stanley Fish.26 
In 2005, Professor Julie Stone Peters of Columbia University, 
herself the holder of a Ph.D. in comparative literature as well as a J.D., 
published an essay in PMLA, the flagship journal of the Modern 
Language Association of America, reflecting in the over thirty-year 
history of the law and literature movement, Law, Literature, and the 
Vanishing Real: On the Future of an Interdisciplinary Illusion.27 She 
uses the events at a colloquium of law and literature professors at a 
“great and august university” (as she puts it) in the mid-1990s to 
describe the history of the law and literature movement and of the 
expectations and disappointments of the different parties in the 
humanities and legal disciplines.28 The humanities professors at the 
colloquium were disappointed with the law professors, wondering why 
the law professors were not interested in “using law as that great tool 
of revolutionary power it had the potential to be.”29 Alternatively, the 
law professors wondered how humanities professors thought of law in 
such reductive terms, as a “monolithic, hegemonic monster at the gates, 
rather than . . . boring, ornate, often funny, sometimes tragic, and 
more.”30 
Professor Peters’s comments highlighted the divisions and 
misgivings that each discipline had about the other, and about the future 
of the university in general: “[O]ne might understand the field of law 
and literature as the expression of more general anxieties about the 
nature and value of the organization of academic study into disciplines 
and about the function and meaning of the humanities and human 
sciences in the last quarter of the twentieth century.”31 
Professor Peters outlines three distinct critical avenues employed in 
the law and literature movement, which she describes as morphing into 
 
26 E.g., STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF 
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980). Some additional central texts of the law and literature, 
or law and humanities movements include Robert Cover’s Narrative, Violence, and the Law 
and Robin West’s Narrative, Authority, and Law. ROBERT COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, 
AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992); ROBIN 
WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW (1993). There are, of course, also scores of 
essays on the topic. 
27 See generally Julie Stone Peters, Law, Literature, and the Vanishing Real: On the 
Future of an Interdisciplinary Illusion, 120 PMLA 442 (2005). 
28 Id. at 442. 
29 Id. at 443. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 444. 
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a still broader movement she calls, “law, culture, and the 
humanities.”32 These three approaches—humanistic, hermeneutic, and 
narrative—align with three distinct ways of considering the 
interdisciplinary crossover of law and the humanities. 
A. Humanism 
According to Peters, the humanist approach emphasizes a 
commitment to the “human” as an “ethical corrective to the scientific 
and technocratic visions of law that had dominated most of the 
twentieth century.”33 Such an approach aims to inject a healthy dose of 
humanism into the field of legal study, reviving the repressed 
humanistic component in the law—the idea that law is not about 
“mechanistic rigor,” but a study of the “rich humanity” and humanistic 
concepts that are central to law, including “criminality, punishment, 
[and] justice.”34 It seems important to add that this list could include 
questions about ethics, inquiries into human nature, and more. 
In essence, the humanist approach is a bit like legal realism’s 
response to legal formalism, this time using literary narrative and its 
storytelling methods, along with metaphorical play, to create meaning. 
The humanist approach entails an inquiry into fundamental 
components of the human condition as told in narrative. This approach 
is the source of Richard Weisberg’s coining of the term “poethics,” 
where literature is used to fill what he perceived as an ethical void in 
overly formalistic legal education.35 The humanist approach is also an 
approach akin to Garrett Epps’s study of Smith, to which I shall turn 
shortly. 
There is much to support such humanist approaches, though it seems 
a bit unfair to the tradition of ethical commitment that is prominent 
among some major figures in American law. Is it really correct to 
suggest that the opinions of Justices William Brennan, William O. 
Douglas, and Thurgood Marshall lacked a profound ethical dimension? 
And what does this approach have to say about the idea, suggested by 
thinkers like Stanley Fish, Owen Fiss, and Ronald Dworkin, that the 
law is always telling a narrative, that it is always concerned with the 
ethical and humanistic dimensions of experience, and that it is neither 
dispassionate nor sterile in the face of competing human desires? As I 
 
32 Id. at 451. 
33 Id. at 444. 
34 Id. 
35 WEISBERG, supra note 23, at 4–5. 
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will try to argue, even when the law seems to have pocketed its ethical 
compass, the sheer fact that it cannot avoid ethically significant issues 
reminds us that the humanistic can never be severed from the law. This, 
indeed, is one of the lessons of Dave Frohnmayer’s actions in Smith. 
B. Hermeneutics 
In the most general sense, hermeneutics is concerned with 
interpretation. More precisely, hermeneutic theory focuses on the 
methodology by which truth and meaning are produced.36 Early 
hermeneutic theory involved the exegesis of Biblical texts, an 
interpretive practice with obvious affinities to a broad spectrum of 
foundational texts.37 Hence the attraction between hermeneutic theory 
in literature, theology, and constitutional interpretation, all of which 
address issues like original meaning, authorial intent, reader reception, 
and much more. 
Literary hermeneutics is outlined most powerfully in the work of 
philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, who points out that all fields of 
inquiry are the product of a complex interaction of reader, text, and 
history, creating what Gadamer calls a “fusion of horizons.”38 Gadamer 
tells us that all understanding involves seeing a text as a complex 
historical, epistemological, and even ontological entity.39 Any quest for 
pristine foundationalist authority misunderstands the dialectial, living 
nature of the text as something akin to an “event,” as a dynamic 
phenomenon that changes through time in relation to those who receive 
 
36 See David E. Linge, Editor’s Introduction to HANS-GEORG GADAMER, 
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS xi (David E. Linge ed. & trans., 1976).(“[Philosophical 
hermeneutics] seeks to throw light on the fundamental conditions . . . of understanding in 
all its modes, scientific and nonscientific alike . . . .”). 
37 Id. at xii. 
38 HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 299–306 (Joel Weinsheimer & 
Donald G. Marshall trans., Bloomsbury Academic 2d rev. ed. 2004) (1975). Gadamer 
describes an active relation between history and the present as “effective-history,” which 
includes the claim that historical understanding is a “fusion of horizons” that effects 
historical consciousness. Id. In his words: 
There is no more an isolated horizon of the present . . . than there are historical 
horizons . . . . Rather, understanding is always the fusion of these horizons 
supposedly existing by themselves. . . . Every encounter with tradition that takes 
place within historical consciousness involves the experience of a tension between 
the text and the present. . . . In the process of understanding, a real fusing of 
horizons occurs . . . . 
Id. at 306–07. 
39 Id. at 291. 
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it (or, read, interpret, or construe it).40 As Peters puts it, “[t]hus, the 
‘hermeneutic turn’ in law was at once an attack on foundationalist 
interpretation, with its reactionary consequences, and a reconstructive 
enterprise—an attempt to shore up the stability of law against its 
ruin.”41 
It seems a bit extreme to argue that law was buttressing itself 
“against its ruin” by invoking hermeneutic models, but the approach 
was attractive in light of academic trends during the 1980s. Peters 
points out that hermeneutics provided a response to the relativistic 
ethics of postmodern and deconstructive practices then in vogue, which 
threatened principles of objectivity, procedural, and ethical certainty 
that are central to the law.42 To be a lawyer, according to this model, is 
to be someone who works to get things right once in a while, to be 
someone who can feel good at the end of the day, and feel relatively 
certain that her practice was ethically correct in some larger sense.43 
Postmodern critiques of power and power structures raised significant 
and important questions about this assumption by showing that latent 
systems of power and discursive organization are implicit in all modes 
of understanding, thus undermining the freedom and agency of the 
practicing lawyer, from the smallest one-person firm to the largest 
administrative conglomerate. 
It is not terribly difficult to see how this model would apply in 
practical reality. Discursive forms (one might call them descriptive 
terms, or even just plain “words”) do more than describe the world: 
they classify, differentiate, and even create the objects in the world. The 
vast proliferation of new legal terms and theories in the field of 
intellectual property following the advent of digital technology is just 
one case in point. As Marshall Leaffer puts it in his Understanding 
Copyright Law, the 1976 Copyright Act, when enacted, was considered 
a model of thoughtful and progressive legal construction, yet was 
significantly underpowered in relation to the forces that the digital 
 
40 See generally id. 
41 Peters, supra note 24, at 446. 
42 Id. at 447. 
43 RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 318 (1979). Rorty 
argues for what might be called a “modest” and “conversational” notion of truth and ethical 
rightness, going so far as to point out that many of our ethical and epistemological problems 
are the result of positing a “sure” answer to inquiry. See id. Rorty characterizes hermeneutics 
in the following way: “Hermeneutics sees the relations between various discourses as those 
of strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which presupposes no disciplinary 
matrix which unites the speakers, but where the hope of agreement is never lost so long as 
the conversation lasts.” Id. 
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revolution began to release within a decade.44 An even simpler 
example may indicate the relationship between discursive forms 
(descriptors) and the world: the idea of a “controlled substance.” How 
does, for example, a peyote button turn into, or even better, “morph” 
into, a legal object? Michel Foucault’s life work aimed to show how 
what we say is also what we see. His masterpiece, Les Mots et Les 
Choses (best translated as Words and Things, not The Order of Things, 
as is normally the case) explores how western conceptions of law and 
subjectivity shifted dramatically after the Renaissance.45 The concept 
of religion is a case in point. The word “religion” not only describes a 
condition or object, but creates it as well, as is suggested in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Seeger in 1965, which defined 
religious belief as “[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies” 
a place “in the life of its possessor.”46 Justice Clark goes on to offer the 
following reflections: 
 Few would quarrel, we think, with the proposition that in no field 
of human endeavor has the tool of language proved so inadequate in 
the communication of ideas as it has in dealing with the fundamental 
questions of man’s predicament in life, in death or in final judgment 
and retribution. . . . There are those who think of God as the depth of 
our being; others, such as the Buddhists, strive for a state of lasting 
rest through self-denial and inner purification; in Hindu philosophy, 
the Supreme Being is the transcendental reality which is truth, 
knowledge and bliss. . . . But we hasten to emphasize that while the 
“truth” of a belief is not open to question, there remains the 
significant question whether it is “truly held.” This is the threshold 
question of sincerity which must be resolved in every case.47 
C. Narrative 
Peters describes the third prong of the literature and law movement 
as the “narrative” model, which she claims is “best-suited to join the 
legal vision of the truth of literature to the literary vision of the reality 
of law.”48 Beginning in the late 1980s, and closely associated with 
feminist scholarship that attempted to recover the repressed voices of 
women, the narrative model also sought to extend those voices beyond 
 
44 See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 9–11 (4th ed. 2005). 
45 See generally Preface to MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN 
ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES viii, xv–xxiv (Vintage Books ed., Random 
House 1994) (1966). 
46 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). 
47 Id. at 174–75, 184. 
48 Peters, supra note 24, at 446. 
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the sometimes insular dimensions of literature and cultural studies 
departments.49 Two features characterize this approach. First, the 
disclosure, through critical reading and listening, of the implicit master 
narratives of the law (the unstated ideological subtext, if you will).50 
This first step identifies the subterranean or unconscious drives behind 
the law’s power.51 The second feature involves cultivating and 
listening to the stories of those left behind or subjugated to the law.52 
This movement, alternately called “narrative jurisprudence” or “legal 
storytelling” claims both psychotherapeutic and political virtues: 
Narrative ameliorates the condition of the speaker by giving voice to 
repressed suffering; at the same time, the disclosure of such stories 
reminds the law of its political duty—the betterment of the human 
condition.53 Robin West makes this point explicit in her 1993 work, 
Narrative, Authority, and Law.54 She notes that we must ask ourselves 
whether “the laws we enact . . . serve our best understanding of our true 
human needs, our true human aspirations, or our true social and 
individual potential, as gleaned from the stories we tell about ourselves 
and each other.”55 
In the end, Peters tells us, the essential components of the law and 
literature project, and by extension, all humanistic legal study, can be 
reduced to three goals: (1) ethical authenticity, (2) ontological 
certainty, and (3) narrative honesty.56 While I am not certain of the 
possibility of ontological certainty in any field of human endeavor, 
ethical authenticity and narrative honesty seem within our reach. 
Indeed, as I have suggested before, they constitute the crux of the 
humanistic in the law, and illustrate the fact that humanistic inquiry 
cannot be severed from either the study or the practice of law. The 
reflective nature of humanistic inquiry is built into the legal field; it 
cannot be excised. And, today, the legal narrative movement captures 
this element of the humanistic more than any other, creating a larger 
constellation that might be called “law, culture, and the humanities.” 
  
 
49 See id. at 446–47. 




54 WEST, supra note 26, at 7. 
55 Id. (emphasis added). 
56 Peters, supra note 27, at 450. 
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IV 
LEGAL NARRATIVE BY EXAMPLE: GARRETT EPPS PEYOTE VS. THE 
STATE: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ON TRIAL 
 Above all, what is particularly significant in Epps’ telling of the 
SMITH decision is its reminder that the law is a human institution. 
Law is built or constructed by human beings acting individually and 
collectively to meet society’s needs. The law so constructed then 
determines the course of others’ lives in the future.57 
A powerful example of legal storytelling and legal narrative as a 
point of intersection between law and the humanities can be found in 
Professor Garrett Epps’s 2009 account of what is arguably the most 
famous case in Dave’s legal career, Unemployment Division v. Smith. 
Epps’s description of the events that led to and followed the decision is 
poignant, compassionate, and humane. It evokes a style of history 
writing—and this is, indeed, a case of U.S. history unfolding, not just 
a Supreme Court decision—associated with figures like Howard Zinn 
in A People’s History of the United States,58 as well as Peter Irons in A 
People’s History of the Supreme Court.59 But it also tells the story of 
the peyote cases from an intimate perspective, emphasizing the 
unlikely intersection of Al Smith and Dave Frohnmayer before the 
bench of the U.S. Supreme Court. Insofar as a practice (peyote use for 
sacramental purposes) collides with a principle (legal exemption from 
criminalized activity for religious reasons), we have the stuff of 
authentic populist drama. Epps’s narrative goes still further: it weaves 
the complex fabrics of Oregon politics; the tragedy of the Frohnmayer 
family’s struggle with Fanconi anemia; the personal struggles and 
renewal of Al Smith and Galen Black, the two principle litigants in the 
case; and the oddly changing opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Epps’s study reads like a mystery novel, and there, indeed, are essential 
mysteries at the core of this case, some dramatic and some sacred—a 
point to which I will return later. 
The facts of Smith are lore in Oregon and, indeed, throughout the 
world.60 Al Smith was a recovering alcoholic and member of the 
 
57 Susan E. Grogan, Peyote vs. the State: Religious Freedom on Trial, 19 LAW & POL. 
BOOK REV. 578, 579 (2007) (book review). 
58 HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492–PRESENT 
(2005). 
59 PETER IRONS, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT: THE MEN AND WOMEN 
WHOSE CASES AND DECISIONS HAVE SHAPED OUR CONSTITUTION (rev. ed. 2006). 
60 In an illustration of the law’s cross-disciplinary interests, a survey of reviews of Peyote 
vs. the State: Religious Freedom on Trial turns up international sites and sources, like the 
U.K.-based Psychedelic Press, Thrillers Book Publishing, and more. See, e.g., 
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Klamath tribe who had gone through repeated detribalizing and 
assimilating practices at the hands of U.S. government agencies.61 He 
was also a member of the Native American Church, a relatively loose 
confederation of Native denominations that made use of peyote in its 
sacraments.62 Smith worked at ADAPT63 as a drug and alcohol 
counselor along with Galen Black (himself not a Native American), 
another recovering alcoholic turned counselor, whom Epps describes 
as “an American original, a spiritual seeker who is also a genuine 
rolling stone.”64 In the fall of 1983 and 1984, both Black and Smith 
participated in a supervised spiritual ritual that included ingesting 
peyote.65 Both were fired from their jobs as counselors, and both were 
denied unemployment benefits for “willful violation of the standards 
of behavior” stemming from their violation of an abstinence-only 
policy at ADAPT.66 
Many of the law review articles on Smith express a bit of wonder at 
the fact that the situation escalated at all, particularly to the point of 
overturning fifty-year-old Supreme Court precedent, Sherbert v. 
Verner.67 Epps attributes at least part of this to the impressive 
stubbornness and integrity of Al Smith (certainly a heroic figure in the 
saga), combined with the just-concluded struggle of the Office of the 
Oregon Attorney General with Rajneeshpuram, a religious group that 
had established itself in eastern Oregon, and had engaged in various 
activities aimed at ensuring its semi-autonomous status there—
activities that ranged from the problematic to the illegal, including 
poisoning and germ warfare.68 By the time this battle had ended, 
Rajneeshpuram had been disbanded, many of its leaders jailed, and 
some sense of order restored to the area surrounding Antelope, 
Oregon.69 
 
PSYPRESSUK, Peyote vs. the State by Garrett Epps, PSYCHEDELIC PRESS UK (Feb. 12, 
2013), http://psypressuk.com/2013/02/12/literary-review-peyote-vs-the-state-by-garrett       
-epps/; Peyote vs. the State: Religious Freedom on Trial, THRILLERS BOOKS, http://www 
.thrillersbooks.net/book/Peyote-vs-The-State/9780806140261/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2016). 
61 EPPS, supra note 1, at 7–16. 
62 Id. at 50, 57–59. 
63 Id. at 86. ADAPT refers to the Douglas County Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment. Id. at 84. It is both an in- and out-patient facility, based in 
Roseburg, Oregon. Id. at 85. 
64 Id. at 88. 
65 Id. at 91, 100. 
66 Id. at 96–100. 
67 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
68 EPPS, supra note 1, at 79–81. 
69 Id. at 79. 
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This brings me back to the point I deferred earlier. Religious belief 
and practice are often a response to the dense materiality of the world—
a materiality that can be rich, fertile, and lovely, but which can also be 
impoverishing, harsh, and even unthinkingly cruel. In both of the above 
cases—Smith and the attorney general opinion issued by Dave 
regarding Rajneeshpuram—the conflict between spiritual and secular 
life hastened into focus. Most importantly, no strictly procedural 
mechanism for resolving the conflict can be imagined. To think of law 
and religion is to think of the essence of human belief and practice. It 
is to think of the humanities—not as an addendum, but as central to the 
law. 
V 
DAVE FROHNMAYER, SMITH, AND HUMANISTIC INQUIRY 
One of the most heart rending features of the Smith story is, of 
course, not about the case at all, but about the struggle of the 
Frohnmayer family with Fanconi anemia, a condition that would 
ultimately take the lives of two of Dave and Lynn’s daughters.70 It is 
hard to even begin to imagine the nature of such loss, nor the strength 
required to fight against it so long and with such unmatchable dignity 
and courage. 
In addition, Dave was a political and academic force in Oregon: an 
attorney general, law school professor, dean, and university 
president.71 Each one of those jobs required immensely astute analytic 
and procedural skills, as well as highly developed political and 
negotiating talents. What one might not associate with such a vita 
would be a (stated or unstated) commitment, and “acting out of” the 
legacy of the humanities. What I have tried to express in my discussion 
of Smith, and of the situation of the humanities in legal study, is that 
law is always engaged with the humanities. Moreover, law is among 
the most closely aligned fields of study with the humanities, to the point 
that it is a part of the humanities. As much as literature? As much as 
dance? As much as philosophy? In many ways, yes. And, ironically, 
Smith points in this direction. 
To illustrate my point—I will not try to prove it, but will merely 
offer it for heuristic purposes—I point to the remarks made by Dave at 
 
70 Id. at 30–31, 225–26. 
71 Garrett Epps, The Man Who Wrestled Death to a Draw, ATLANTIC (Mar. 15, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/the-man-who-wrestled-death-to-a        
-drw/387760/. 
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the California Law Review’s banquet for “Alumnus of the Year” in 
2011. In April of that year, the recently retired University of Oregon 
president was asked to speak about some of the lessons learned from 
his days as the California Law Review’s chief notes and comments 
editor during the 1966–67 academic year.72 Such events are often 
occasions for nostalgic reverie, but President Frohnmayer short-
circuited that avenue from the start, when he pointed out that basking 
in “past glories” was a fool’s charge: 
[O]ne goes from “who’s who” to “who’s he?” very rapidly. Last 
summer, Lynn was a footstep behind me walking down the streets of 
Portland when we passed a couple, one of whom turned around and 
Lynn heard him say to his companion, “That used to be Dave 
Frohnmayer, I think.”73 
First rule of humanistic inquiry? Irony. Things are always both more 
and less than they seem. 
Dave went on to address a number of themes in that talk, all of 
which, ironically enough, could have doubled as a list of core concerns 
for a professor of the humanities. He started with a discussion of the 
social tumult and shifting nature of the law in the 1960s.74 Historically 
an instrument of the status quo, the law became, he tells us, “an overtly 
creative instrument.”75 In light of the “incessant, ominous, and 
oppressive” reality of the Vietnam War and the draft, along with the 
full flowering of the civil rights movement, the law had by necessity, 
by historical circumstance, and perhaps by sheer momentum, become 
a powerful lever in forging a different world.76 But Dave elaborated, 
commenting about creative forces and energies that would change the 
face of American law and culture, and not more than a few human lives, 
for this was the new culture of self-expression that had come to mark 
America.77 And, one must add, Berkeley was certainly a locus for such 
expressive transformation and experimentation, which signaled the 
permanent closure to the “silent fifties.” Dave put it this way (and with 
more than a little whimsy) when it came to drugs and their legal and 
extra-legal use in American culture: 
 
72 See generally Dave Frohnmayer, Remembrance and Renewal, 3 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 
136 (2012) (extension of his remarks). 
73 Id. at 136–37. 
74 Id. at 137–38. 
75 Id. at 137. 
76 Id. at 137–38. 
77 Id. at 138. 
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The culture of self expression, whether it was through the 
understanding that drugs emerged from something other than 
pharmacies, to the invention of the birth control pill, which 
remarkably changed relationships between the genders—all these 
things were part of the cultural milieu of the times. The celebration 
of liberation was new, not fully examined, and in continuous 
evolution.78 
A number of his observations bear additional commentary here, in 
large part because they point to the ineluctable intersection of 
humanistic and legal inquiry. First, we might note the tongue-in-cheek 
reference to the emergence of drugs acquired from sources other than 
the corner drug stores immortalized in Norman Rockwell’s visions of 
early twentieth-century America. Second, Dave made reference to the 
liberating cultural practices that took root in late-fifties beatnik culture 
and openly flourished during the sixties—part of this was the result of 
the introduction of a medico-technical product, the birth control pill.79 
Most importantly, Dave invoked a central tenet of humanistic 
inquiry when he suggested, albeit in passing, the centrality of the 
“examined life” that we owe to Plato.80 The celebration of liberation 
that he cited was indeed new, evolving, and not yet examined or fully 
understood. 
The new world of self-exploration that Dave recalled was not 
without its cultural opponents. Within days of his arrival as part of the 
1964 law school class at Berkeley, the university administration 
“banned the use of political tables” at an intersection abutting the main 
campus.81 Politically charged speech, it seemed, had its limits—an 
 
78 Id. 
79 The degree to which sixties “liberatory culture” was in fact liberating was the subject 
of a number of studies by Frankfurt School philosophy Herbert Marcuse, who fled Nazi 
persecution to settle at the University of San Diego. Bararella Fokos, The Bourgeois Marxist, 
SAN DIEGO READER (Aug. 23, 2007), http://www.sandiegoreader.com/news/2007/aug/23 
/bourgeois-marxist/#. Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man and Eros and Civilization ask 
whether the freedoms of sixties’ consumer and hedonistic culture were in fact as “free” as 
we have come to believe. HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
INQUIRY INTO FREUD (1955); HERBERT MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN 
THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964); see also CHRISTOPHER 
LASCH, THE CULTURE OF NARCISSISM: AMERICAN LIFE IN AN AGE OF DIMINISHING 
EXPECTATIONS (1979) (extending Marcuse’s skeptical analysis into the period of 
diminishing expectations that followed the nearly thirty-year post−World War II settlement 
and period of economic growth). 
80 Socrates’s famous maxim states, in double-negative form, that “the unexamined life is 
not worth living.” Sitze et al., supra note 6, at 192 (quoting PLATO, THE APOLOGY OF 
SOCRATES 38a (H.N. Fowler trans., 1953)). One might call this a form of obiter dicta, but it 
seems more than a mere aside; it feels like a tenet for the good life. 
81 Frohnmayer, supra note 72, at 138. 
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assertion of administrative authority that would mark Attorney General 
Frohnmayer’s most famous and contentious case some twenty-five 
years later, and raised the kind of difficult sociopolitical questions that 
are absolutely central to the law. His words are eloquent and prescient: 
And before our eyes emerged the galvanizing and difficult events of 
the Free Speech Movement. It was important in the lives of all of us 
because it not only caused us to question, to wonder, to explore the 
extent to which the First Amendment applies to student life and 
public speaking, but also to reflect on the emergence of the 
applicability of the due process clause to public universities and for 
that matter to a whole reach of other public institutions. And finally 
we were forced by events to reflect on the use, utility, and propriety 
of civil disobedience as a technique for achieving social change.82 
Free speech, civil disobedience, and social change: What could be 
more central to the humanist project? All of these concerns, which 
harken to the work of figures like Emerson and Thoreau, are not mere 
accompaniments to inquiry and improvement of the human condition; 
they are not occasional addenda to the study and practice of law; they 
are essential and inalienable components of both kinds of practice, 
whether we care to admit it or not; and, finally, they call out for 
individual commitment in the legal world that evokes, said Dave, a 
“powerful subtext: the expectation of personal, social, and political 
involvement in the face of things that needed to be changed.”83 
This is heady stuff; it was a heady time. As Garrett Epps pointed out 
in his study of Smith, however, the quotidian experience of a practicing 
lawyer, or a practicing attorney general, is less than glamorous: “Much 
of the work of any state attorney general’s office involves reading and 
responding to meritless appeals . . . . It is tedious, stultifying work.”84 
The study of law involves attention to minutiae, to seemingly 
insignificant details, and attention to historical precedent at a level that 
can exhaust even the most joyous obsessive. In his speech for the 
California Law Review, Dave told his audience that he and his 
colleagues were terrified at the thought of even one citation error, often 
jesting that they were working for the “Cali Flaw Review.”85 
There is more to this point than mere jest, however. Cite checking 
may not be glamorous, but it shows respect for process and history—




84 EPPS, supra note 1, at 142. 
85 Frohnmayer, supra note 72, at 140. 
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suggested that “cite checking technique is, or can be, a creative act, not 
simply a matter of validating forms of footnote expression.”86 How is 
such a statement even conceivable, one wonders. The answer is not too 
hard when we reflect on what a citation does: cite checking is akin to 
historical inquiry, albeit in a distinctly legal form. It is a form of respect 
for truth, in a certain format, to be sure. But in an era when truth is 
often on the run, it is a point worth remembering. It also shows a 
concern with authority, a term whose potentially ironic or multivalent 
meaning might be played with once again. What if our notion of 
“authority” is not merely legal but internal, communitarian, and even 
spiritual? Is it not a good idea to understand that our claims to authority 
matter? What if legal inquiry is understood as a collective effort at 
cultural understanding, and of the generation of meaning? 
I know I am pushing the envelope a bit here (Cite checking as a noble 
and humanistic form of inquiry?), but I would like to suggest that the 
research drudgery of the law may be less melancholy and forlorn a 
practice than some may think, as Dave pointed out in his address, 
because the presumed division between the (lively) world of the 
humanities and the (somber) world of law is not so absolute as it may 
seem. Professor White has argued for forty years that legal education 
should include liberal or humanistic education, and that lawyers have 
much to learn from literature.87 In his view, lawyers should learn from 
their own experience, and should “learn from one’s culture and 
contribute to it . . . accepting ambiguity and uncertainty as the condition 
of life.”88 In Law and the Humanities: An Introduction, the editors tell 
us that Professor White has recognized fundamental artistry—not 
merely formal training—in the world of law: 
White calls us to a vision of the lawyer as artist. It is a vision of art 
in which beauty and sublimity of thought and expression are not ends 
in themselves, but rather one of the best defenses we have against 
what White . . . calls the “empire of force.” We need to make sure 
that our speech is alive—that we mean what we say, say what we 
mean, and have something to say—so that our language, especially 
our legal language, does not become an empty instrument for the 
unrestrained exercise of power.89 
 
86 Id. at 139. 
87 See generally WHITE, supra note 20. 
88 Id. at xv. 
89 Austin Sarat et al., Introduction: On the Origins and Prospects of the Humanistic Study 
of Law, in LAW AND THE HUMANITIES: AN INTRODUCTION 1, 4–5 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 
2010) (citing JAMES BOYD WHITE, LIVING SPEECH: RESISTING THE EMPIRE OF FORCE 
(2006)). 
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To underscore this point, the editors draw an analogy between law 
and religion that, again, has more than passing irony in the context of 
then Attorney General Frohnmayer’s representation in Smith: “[A] 
reverence for law can be a form of faith, in the fullest sense,” they tell 
us.90 “Indeed, in the case of the United States in particular, the religious 
imaginary is more than vestigial; it is arguably at the core of the 
American cultural experience of the idea of the rule of law. . . . [It] has 
the trappings of a civic religion.”91 This is not to suggest that law is 
merely an article of faith, but that its centrality to human experience is 
so fundamental as to possess an aura that approaches the sacred. While 
we can point to the statutes and decisions that make up the recorded 
body of the law, just as we can point to religious texts that tell the 
narrative of human experience in the face of the existentially uncertain 
world, we cannot point at law, nor the humanities, nor religion and 
casually say, “There it is.” The fabric of law, like the fabrics of 
narrative and religious belief, are threaded too tightly to stand alone. 
Again, from Law and the Humanities: 
[L]ife under the rule of law is more than an implied social contract; 
it is a structure of feeling, a way of being in the world, which reflects 
a rich, complex, and deeply embedded set of traditions and cultural 
practices, a way of being that law and humanities scholars seek to 
understand.92 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: POWER, FAITH, AND THE LAW 
The intersections I have attempted to draw here come full circle in 
the last section of Dave’s address on behalf of the California Law 
Review. As he brought his address to a close, he spoke of the 
disempowered, and of those unable to speak, before the oft-
intimidating edifice of the law.93 He returned again and again to 
questions of voice (what humanist scholars sometimes rather clumsily 
call “narrative efficacy”) and power. Lawyers, he reminded us, are 
expected to use their talents in the civic arena on behalf of those who 
do not possess such skills.94 Law, in this context, is an act of 
translation; it is an activity that crosses the boundaries of social, 
political, economic, and legal groupings; it is an act that makes the 
opaque decipherable; it is humanistic inquiry and practice combined. 
 
90 Id. at 16. 
91 Id. at 16–17. 
92 Id. at 17. 
93 Frohnmayer, supra note 72, at 142. 
94 Id. 
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“[W]e are supposed,” he said, “to understand what it is to represent 
someone who does not have a tongue, a voice, a pen (or a word 
processor). We speak for those who are powerless and for those, even 
if armed, who cannot effectively be heard.”95 
We have returned to the issues of narrative, voice, history, and the 
collective efforts at an understanding of the good life—or, at the very 
least, a better life. In his closing remarks, Dave spoke about the 
obligation that all lawyers have for service.96 Just after finishing law 
school, he was appointed as pro bono counsel in a successful habeas 
corpus action on behalf of Guadalupe Hernandez, then imprisoned at 
San Quentin.97 For the next eighteen months he represented a number 
of “otherwise powerless clients” and made a difference in their lives.98 
Dave, thus, returned to the idea of law as a “creative instrument” that 
can make a difference. 
Powerlessness here invokes an array of issues: a lack of access, a 
lack of resources, and a lack of voice. Again, we see law as an act of 
humanistic intervention and translation. Dave ended with these lovely 
remarks. The law, and the lawyers who practice, should endeavor to 
[m]ake things better; do not just follow the lazier or the faddish or the 
convenient. Second, to create a desire to seek and build communities 
of spirit, not just communities of interest. And third, to be builders 
with these tools: to embrace your challenges, unafraid of innovation, 
and eager to create anew.99 
This might well be a list of the essential features of humanistic 
inquiry: be alert to the seductiveness of fads by maintaining a 
thoughtful, critical eye; avoid the seductions of power that might be an 
element of participation in particular interests; innovate and create. 
Most importantly, for my purposes, Dave suggested that we build 
communities of spirit, the notion that there is more to the law than mere 
professional competence. Coming from the man that argued before the 
Supreme Court in Unemployment Division v. Smith, the idea that he 
would invoke a community of spirit shows once again the irony that is 
inherent in the law. Cultivation of the human spirit seems to trump all, 
as Dave reminded us. He reminded us, as well, that law is humanistic 




96 Id. at 143–44. 
97 Id. at 143. 
98 Id. at 143–44. 
99 Id. at 144. 
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